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Jurisdiction over Consumer, Employment, and Insurance 
Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation Recast 
Enhancing the Protection of the Weaker Party 
Aleš Galič*, University of Ljubljana 
Abstract: This article aims to present and critically assess the changes which the Recast 
Brussels I Regulation brought to the protective regime for the weaker parties. Although these 
changes are not as far-reaching as in other fields, they are nevertheless important. The most 
significant changes concern the limited extension of the scope of applicability against defend-
ants from third states and jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance. Although these 
changes improve the procedural protection of the weaker parties in principle, some new dilem-
mas arise, which are liable to jeopardize certainty and predictability of the jurisdictional regime. 
Keywords: Brussels I Regulation; international jurisdiction; weaker parties; jurisdiction agree-
ment; recognition and enforcement. 
I. Introduction
Parties that are regarded as weaker from the socio-economic point of view in a contractual rela-
tionship must be offered adequate protection not only in substantive but also in procedural law.1 
The latter also extends, although not exclusively, to the requirement that such parties should be 
protected by the rules of jurisdiction more favourable to their interests than the general rules. 
The Brussels I Regulation contains three special sections establishing a protective jurisdictional 
regime: for policyholders and other beneficiaries under insurance contracts (Section 3), for indi-
vidual contracts of employment (Section 5 of Chapter II), and for (certain categories of2) consum-
er contracts (Section 4). The system of protection introduced in these sections of the Brussels I 
Regulation is based on the idea that these parties are in a weaker position vis-à-vis the other 
party to the contract (insurers, employers, or traders), regarding their bargaining power, the cost 
* Dr. Aleš Galič is Full Professor of Civil Procedure and International Private Law at the University of Ljubljana,
Slovenia. 
1 Cf. Vesna Lazić, Procedural Justice for “Weaker Parties” in Cross-Border Litigation under the EU Regulatory Scheme, 
UTRECHT LAW REVIEW, Nov. 2014, 100; Giuliano and Lagarde Report on the Convention on the law applicable to con-
tractual obligations, OJ C 282, 31. 10. 1980, 1. 
2 Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation (now Art. 17 of the Brussels I Recast), procedural protection for 
consumers only applies if “(a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or (b) it is a contract 
for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit made to finance the sale of goods; or (c) in all 
other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in 
the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State […]” 
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risk of litigation, their level of knowledge, and access to legal information and advice.3 These par-
ties should not be discouraged from suing by being compelled to bring action before the courts 
in the Contracting State in which the other party to the contract is domiciled.4 Pursuing a claim in 
a foreign jurisdiction would rarely be a realistic option for a weaker party – due to the higher cost 
risk, the loss of time due to travel, unfamiliarity with the foreign court and law system, as well as 
the language of the proceedings. Thus the right of access to court would remain guaranteed on a 
purely theoretical level only; it would, however, be ineffective in practice. Mutatis mutandis, the 
same reasoning applies to the weaker party who must act as a defendant in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Defending a claim in a foreign jurisdiction is usually unrealistic for a consumer, employee, or the 
insured. 
The legal framework of protection concerning consumer and insurance contracts was established 
already in the 1968 Brussels Convention.5 However, individual employment contracts were 
ignored in the mentioned Convention,6 consequently subjecting them to the general rules and to 
the special rule on contractual obligations. Certain steps towards better protection of employees 
were taken in the case law of the CJEU7 and, later, in the 1989 amendment to the Brussels Con-
vention.8 The protection of employees was further extended in the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, which further elaborated the system applying to consumer and 
insurance disputes.  
On 10 January 2015 the Brussels I Regulation Recast (Regulation No. 1215/20129) entered into 
force, marking the implementation of the long-awaited reform of the Brussels regime. Certain 
changes adopted through this reform also affect the protective jurisdictional regime for the 
weaker parties.  
The special protective jurisdictional regime consists of three main elements: (1) additional and 
favourable bases for jurisdiction are available for the weaker party when he acts as the claimant, 
such as the place of the claimant’s domicile in consumer and insurance disputes or the place 
where the employee habitually carries out his work in individual labour disputes; (2) a restriction 
prescribing that the weaker party, when in the position of a defendant, may only be sued in the 
place of his domicile; (3) the possibility for the parties to enter a jurisdiction agreement departing 
from the aforementioned jurisdictional regime is significantly restricted.  
                                                
3 E.g., High Court – Queen’s Bench Division (UK) 7. 11. 2005 – [2005] EWHC 2115 – The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd & 
Ors. See also PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010) 123, Giuliano and Lagarde Report on the Conven-
tion on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ C 282, 31. 10. 1980, 1. 
4 For consumer disputes see, e.g. CJEU 19. 1. 1993, C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton; for a comprehensive over-
view of the CJEU’s case law concerning jurisdiction in labour disputes, see the Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered 
on 16 December 2010 in C-29/10, Heiko Koelzsch/Luxembourg, paras. 53–58. The case relates to the determination 
of the applicable law for labour contracts, but the findings are equally relevant for the issue of jurisdiction. For 
disputes relating to insurance contracts, see CJEU 13. 7. 2000, C-412/98, Group Josi/UGIC. 
5 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,  
OJ L 299, 31. 12. 1972, 32–42. 
6 At that time it was expected that international labour law would be subject to regulation in a separate conven-
tion, however this plan has never materialised. See Abbo Junker, Arbeitsverträge im Internationalen Privat- und 
Prozessrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER GOTTWALD ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 293, 296 (Burkhard Hess et al. eds., 2014). 
7 CJEU 26. 5. 1982, C-133/81, Ivenel/Schwab. 
8 The Convention, signed in San Sebastian on 26 May 1989, upon the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters. 
9 Official Journal of the European Union, 20 December 2012, L 351/1. 
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II. The Extension of Territorial Scope: Defendants from Third States  
As a rule, the 44/2001 Brussels I Regulation was applicable only if the defendant was domiciled in 
an EU Member State. If an action was filed against a third-state defendant, the court in a Member 
State determined its international jurisdiction on the basis of the national law of this State. This 
principle remains in force also after the Recast. However, it no longer applies to jurisdiction over 
consumer contracts and individual contracts of employment (Arts. 6, 18(1), 21(2)). Employees and 
consumers can thus rely on the protection offered by the Brussels I Regulation in disputes with 
employers and traders from third states (Arts. 6, 18(1), 21(2)).10  
This additional protection applies only to consumers and workers when they are in the position 
of a claimant. On the contrary, consumers and employees from third states, when they are in the 
position of a defendant, do not fall within the scope of the Brussels I regime. A trader or an em-
ployer from an EU Member State can still rely on the jurisdiction rules in the national law of the 
forum state in the proceedings against employees or consumers from third states. Nor does the 
discussed extension of the territorial scope of the Regulation apply to disputes arising from in-
surance contracts. 
The extension of the applicability of the Brussels I regime to third-state defendants could also 
produce detrimental effects to the weaker party. For instance, some national laws provide for 
even more claimant-friendly rules on international jurisdiction.11 This concern, which is not par-
ticularly relevant for consumer disputes, is much more relevant for disputes relating to employ-
ment contracts. Here the protective jurisdictional rule in the Brussels I Regulation (now Art. 21(2)) 
does not go as far as to establish a proper forum actoris.12 Rather, the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work is where an action can be brought.13 In most cases, this place will 
correspond to the place of the employee’s domicile, but not necessarily. In addition, unlike in 
consumer cases, most national laws of the EU Member States have traditionally contained special 
protective rules of jurisdiction over employment contracts.14 Often these rules are considerably 
more employee-friendly than those determined in the Brussels I Regulation. They offer jurisdic-
tional bases such as forum actoris (based on either the nationality or domicile of the employee) or 
they provide for a jurisdictional basis when at least a part – although not a predominant or even 
a significant one – of the work was performed within the jurisdiction. Moreover, generally appli-
cable exorbitant bases of jurisdiction could also be invoked, thus enabling the employee to bring 
a lawsuit in his own country (such as the presence of the defendant’s assets within the jurisdic-
                                                
10 A certain extension of the applicability of the Brussels I regime towards defendants from third states was achieved 
already in the previous Regulation – but only where these had a branch, agency, or other establishment in one of 
the Member States and the dispute arose from the operation of this branch, agency, or other establishment 
(Art. 18/2 and Art. 15/2). In such cases, the defendant was deemed to be domiciled in that Member State. 
11 Peter Mankowski, in EUROPÄSCHES ZIVILPROZESS- UND KOLLISIONSRECHT – KOMMENTAR, BRUESSEL IA-VO Art. 21 Brüssel Ia-VO 
Rz 72 (Thomas Rauscher ed., 2016); Sandrine Giroud, Niklaus Meier & Rodrigo Rodriguez, Le règlement Bruxelles I bis, 
un modèle pour une nouvelle convention de Lugano? in LE NOUVEAU RÈGLEMENT BRUXELLES I BIS 419, 430 (Emmanuel 
Guinchard ed., 2014). 
12 See also id. Art. 21 Brüssel Ia-VO Rz 72. 
13 Due to the CJEU’s extensive construction of the “habitual place of work” by the (CJEU 15. 3. 2011, C-29/10, Heiko 
Koelzsch/État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg), the second alternative in Art. 21(1) – jurisdiction in the place of the 
engaging business – has lost its practical significance. 
14 See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regu-
lation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, Brussels, 14. 12. 2010 SEC(2010) 1547 final, 22 and 62–63, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/sec_2010_1547_en.pdf (last visited 3. 1. 2016).  
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tion). Hence, if Art. 21(2) of the Brussels I Recast is interpreted as eliminating and replacing the 
national laws of the Member States, an employee whose habitual place of work is not in the EU 
(and who was not engaged by a business situated in an EU Member State) can no longer estab-
lish the jurisdiction of any court in the EU against an employer without a domicile or a deemed 
domicile in the EU.  
Some authors submit that the Articles 18(1) and 21(2) of the Recast Brussels I Regulation merely 
lay down additional bases (an EU-wide “minimum standard”) for jurisdiction against third-state 
defendants, without abolishing the possibility for the employees to invoke broader jurisdiction 
rules in the national law.15 The opposite view is that national rules of jurisdiction do not apply if 
the matter falls within the scope of Arts. 18(1) or 21(2).16  
Some authors believe that the wording in Arts. 17 and 20 – that the jurisdiction norms in the 
chapters concerning consumers and employees are “without prejudice to Article 6” – leaves no 
doubt that national jurisdiction rules can still be relied on as stipulated in Art. 6.17 However this is 
not the case. The reference to Art. 6 in Arts. 17 and 20 of the Brussels I Recast indeed means that 
this Article remains applicable also in consumer and labour disputes. Yet the problem is that 
there is now a certain restriction of the scope of its applicability in Art. 6. Article 6(1) reads as 
follows: “If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to (emphasis added) Articles 18(1), 21(2) [...] be determined by 
the law of that Member State.” Articles 18 and 21 contain jurisdiction rules for disputes against 
non-EU based traders and employers. So the decisive question concerns the relation, in light of 
the phrase “subject to”, between Art. 6, on the one hand, and Arts. 18(1) and 21(2), on the other. 
It could represent an exception to the general rule that a non-EU based defendant can be sued 
pursuant to national jurisdiction rules. Yet it can also be construed as providing merely for an 
additional option for the claimant. In any case, the grammatical interpretation calls primarily for 
construction of the wording “subject to Art. 18(1), 21(2)” in Art. 6(1) and not merely the wording 
“without prejudice to Art. 6” in Arts. 17 and 20. 
One should look for answers concerning this interpretation in the legislative history. One of the 
most ground-breaking amendments of the Commission’s first Draft Proposal of the Brussels I 
Recast was the extension of all rules of jurisdiction to defendants domiciled in third states.18 This 
controversial plan was rejected by most member states and it was agreed to extend merely some 
                                                
15 Miriam Pohl, Die Neufassung der EuGVVO – im Spannungsfeld zwischen Vertrauen und Kontrolle, 33 IPRAX, 109, 109–
114 (2013), Tanja Domej, Die Neufassung der EuGVVO – Quantensprünge im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht, 78 
RABELSZ, 508, 523 (2014); Florian Scholz, Alles neu im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht? 26 ECOLEX, 4, 5 (2015); Andrea 
Bonomi, Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts, in THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION RECAST 213, 230 (Andrew Dickinson & 
Eva Lein eds., 2015). 
16 Paul Vlas, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME I, BRUSSELS IBIS REGULATION Art. 6 Brussels 
Ibis Regulation Rz 1 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2016); Mankowski, supra note 11, Art. 20 Brüssel Ia-VO 
Rz 2, Art. 21 Brüssel Ia-VO Rz 72; Giroud, Meier & Rodriguez, supra note 11, 430-432; Hélènevan Lith, Jurisdiction – 
General Provisions, in THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION RECAST 113, 124 (Andrew Dickinson & Eva Lein eds., 2015); Beatriz 
Campuzano Diaz, Las normas de competencia judicial internacional del Reglamento 1215/2012 y los demandados 
domiciliados fuera de la UE: Análisis de la reforma, REVISTA ELECTRONICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES, Dec. 2014, 16 et 
seqq. available at: dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4956064.pdf (last visited 15. 1. 2016). 
17 Pohl, supra note 15, 111; Domej, supra note 15, 523; Scholz, supra note 15, 5. On the contrary, some authors 
believe that the grammatical interpretation clearly leads to exactly the opposite result: Giroud, Meier & Rodri-
guez, supra note 11, 430–432. 
18 Brussels, 14. 12. 2010 COM(2010) 748 final 2010/0383 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commer-
cial matters (Recast). 
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of the existing jurisdiction rules. Commentators agree that this was a compromise solution.19 A 
document of the Danish Presidency of the EU, adopted in January 2012 (thus in the time, when 
the mentioned compromise was being negotiated), discusses four options.20 Besides the full 
harmonisation and the maintenance of the status quo, two possible compromise solutions are 
mentioned. One is the so-called “minimum harmonisation”, which would extend the jurisdiction 
rules of the Brussels I Regulation to disputes involving third-state defendants, but at the same 
time allow the national rules on jurisdiction to apply to the extent that they provide further 
access to national courts.  
Another alternative (that had, as the document states, not yet been addressed in the negotia-
tions) could be to extend the jurisdiction rules of the regulation to particular types of disputes 
involving third-state defendants (“partial harmonisation”).21 If these were the only available options, 
it was obviously the “partial harmonisation” that was finally adopted. Of course, it cannot be ruled 
out that in the later stages of negotiations yet another option finally prevailed. Unfortunately “the 
public track” as to what exactly was negotiated during the final year of recasting the Brussels I is 
blurred.22 In a document adopted on 18 October 2012, the European Parliament’s Committee on 
legal affairs rejected the Commission’s proposal for full harmonisation and stated “[…] it is there-
fore proposed that rules be included in the Regulation to introduce only a partial reflexive effect for 
disputes in the field of employment, consumer and insurance contracts, in order to protect the weaker 
party in those situations.”23  
The finally adopted solution has nothing to do with a “reflexive effect”. Nevertheless this docu-
ment enables an insight into what was a very controversial issue at that point: the question of 
whether in “external relations” the EU protective rules for weaker parties should also protect 
non-EU domiciled employees and consumers (which was one of the Commission’s proclaimed 
goals in its initial proposal).24 This idea of “reflexive effect” was deliberately rejected in the end.25 
It is therefore possible that the inclusion of reference to Art. 6 in Arts. 18 and 20 was intended to 
prevent the Regulation’s “reflexive effect” in favour of non-EU based employees and consumers. 
The debate in the EU Parliament on the adoption of the proposed text did not address the issue 
either – although the extension of the applicability of certain jurisdiction rules vis-à-vis third-state 
                                                
19 Vlas, supra note 16, Art. 6 Brussels Ibis Regulation Rz 4; Andrew Dickinson, Background and Introduction to the 
Regulation, in THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION RECAST 1, 12 (Andrew Dickinson & Eva Lein eds., 2015); Mankowski, supra 
note 11, Art. 6 Brüssel Ia-VO Rz 7, Campuzano Diaz, supra note 16, 17. 
20 Discussion Paper – Informal Justice and Home Affairs Ministers’ Meeting Copenhagen 26–27 January 2012 Ses-
sion I (Justice) Brussels I-Regulation Access to Union courts in civil cases with third country defendants, Ministry 
of Justice, available at: http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2012/Discus-
sion_paper_4_Brussels_I-Regulation.pdf (last visited 3. 8. 2016). 
21 Ibidem; See also Christian Rauscher, Die Brüssel I Verordnung und ihre Reform, in EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 
IN ÖSTERREICH III – 10 JAHRE BRÜSSEL I-VERORDNUNG 1, 7 (Bernhard König & Peter G. Mayr eds., 2012). 
22 The text, which in relevant parts corresponds to the finally adopted Regulation, is first included in the Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) – First reading, Brussels, 1 June 2012, 10609/12 ADD 
1 JUSTCIV 209 CODEC 1495, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010609%202012% 
20ADD%201 (last visited 15. 8. 2016). 
23 Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), (COM[2010]0748 – C7-
0433/2010 – 2010/0383[COD]), 15 October 2012, Committee on Legal Affairs.  
24 See, e.g. Beate Gsell, Entwicklungen im Europäischen Verbraucherzuständigkeitsrecht – Reform der EuGVO und Recht-
sprechung des EuGH zum Merkmal des "Ausrichtens" in Art. 15 Abs. 1 lit. c EuGVO, 127 ZZP, 431, 437 (2014). 
25 See id. at 437, Carla M. Gulotta, L’estensione della giurisdizione nei confronti dei datori di lavoro domiciliati all’estero: 
il caso Mahamdia e il nuovo regime del regolamento Bruxelles i-bis., 49 RDIPP 619 (2013). 
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defendants was discussed.26 In addition, the press release of the Council of the EU accompanying 
the adopted Brussels I Recast stated that “no national rules of jurisdiction may be applied any longer 
by Member States in relation to consumers and employees domiciled outside the EU.”27 Perhaps this 
offers a glimpse into how the Brussels I Recast was then understood (although erroneously since 
the extension in the Brussels I Recast applies to non-EU based traders and employers, not con-
sumers and employees). The text of Recital No. 14 does not give answers in this regard either. 
One would, however, legitimately expect that if such an important change in the concept of the 
Regulation really was adopted (providing that certain rules of the Regulation apply against non-
EU based defendants, although without replacing the national jurisdiction rules), this should at 
least be indicated in the Recital or framed in clearer terms.  
The question, however, arises what is objectively the best possible interpretation. By extending 
the territorial scope, the Brussels I Recast (as confirmed in Recital 14) intended to enhance the 
procedural protection of employees (and consumers). It would not be compatible with this pur-
pose if the newly introduced regime meant that employees who habitually carry out work in a 
non-Member State were no longer able to invoke favourable bases for jurisdiction in the national 
law of their countries against third-state employers. It is true that doing away with exorbitant 
jurisdictions in national laws is a desired goal. It would be incoherent, however, if it were exactly 
the most vulnerable categories of claimants – in contrast to all other possible categories of claim-
ants – who would no longer be able to invoke exorbitant bases of jurisdiction provided for in 
national laws against non-EU-based defendants. Since there is no provision on “emergency juris-
diction” in the Brussels I Regulation, this could, in extreme cases, lead to the denial of justice for 
employees domiciled in the EU: non-availability of any court in the EU and no guarantee that any 
third state will accept jurisdiction (or be able to ensure effective access to court).  
Hence, the objective goal of the norm – when it comes to labour disputes – would support the 
view that national jurisdiction rules can still be relied on although Art. 18(2) provides for an EU-
wide uniform rule applicable also against non-EU-based employers. However, the reference to 
Art. 6 is identical in both Art. 17 and Art. 20 of the 1215/2012 Regulation, thus it applies to con-
sumer disputes as well. Yet, with regard to consumers, the stakes are different. The forum actoris 
of Art. 18(1) ensures that an EU-domiciled consumer will always be able to sue “at home”. There 
is no need to maintain the possibility for the consumer to invoke exorbitant national jurisdiction 
rules of any other EU Member States. Thus, the goal of the norm – when it comes to consumers – 
would support the interpretation that national jurisdiction rules can no longer be invoked in dis-
putes against third-state traders. In addition, the purpose of the (proposed) extension of the 
applicability of the Brussels I regime towards third-state defendants was not just to protect 
weaker parties, but also to ensure legal certainty as well as the predictability and transparency of 
the jurisdictional legal framework and to put EU-domiciled claimants on an equal footing con-
                                                
26 Transcripts of the EU parliamentary debate of 19 November 2012, Strasbourg; Available at: http://www.europarl.eu- 
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20121119&secondRef=ITEM-017&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0320 
(last visited 3. 8. 2016). 
27 Recast of the Brussels I regulation: towards easier and faster circulation of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters within the EU, Press Release, Brussels, 6 December 2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-12-483_en.htm (last visited 3. 8. 2016). 
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cerning access to justice.28 These two aspects speak against the interpretation that national juris-
diction rules can still be invoked. 
To conclude, the question whether jurisdiction rules of national laws continue to apply in pro-
ceedings brought by EU-domiciled consumers and employees remains controversial and calls for 
a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The legislative history implies that during the 
negotiations (under growing time-pressure and in quest for a political compromise) on the uni-
form EU-wide jurisdiction rules in Arts. 18(1) and 21(2) the possibly problematic nature of the 
newly introduced system, in certain circumstances liable to deprive employees of the level of 
protection previously enjoyed, has been simply overlooked. 
III. The Exhaustive Nature of Jurisdictional Protective Rules 
The bases for determining the jurisdiction in disputes relating to employment, consumer, and 
insurance contracts set out in Sections 3–5 of the Brussels I Regulation are exhaustive. In such 
disputes it is not possible to invoke the bases for jurisdiction set out in other chapters of the 
Regulation unless explicitly provided for otherwise. The only exception was foreseen for the 
applicability of Art. 5(5) (Art. 7(5) after the Recast) which provides fora jurisdiction in the place 
where the branch, agency, or other establishment is situated. This proved to be especially trouble-
some in labour disputes where employees were prevented from invoking the jurisdiction for co-
defendants pursuant to Art. 6 of the Brussels I Regulation when they wished to bring proceedings 
jointly against two employers. This is becoming increasingly relevant in cases of employment 
arrangements within a multinational group or in cases of cross-border agency employment (“cross-
border triangular employment relationships”). The CJEU confirmed this restriction.29 Thereby it 
admitted that this might be a shortcoming in the system of the Brussels I Regulation. Neverthe-
less it must give priority to an interpretation based on the wording of Art. 18, which is unambigu-
ous and does not leave room for a more creative interpretation.30 This result has been subject to 
heavy criticism in legal literature.31 It can hardly be suggested that the Court of Justice should 
ignore the clear wording of Art. 18; the criticism was (or should be) therefore directed more at 
the Regulation itself.  
The Commission was also aware of this shortcoming and the problem was addressed in the 
drafting of the new Recast Brussels I Regulation.32 Art. 20 (which corresponds to Art. 18 of Regu-
lation 44/2001) of the new Regulation No. 1215/2012 makes a special reference to the jurisdic-
tional rule for co-defendants. Thus, under the Brussels I Recast it is possible for an employee to 
                                                
28 Discussion Paper Informal Justice and Home Affairs Ministers’ Meeting Copenhagen 26–27 January 2012 Session I 
(Justice) Brussels I-Regulation Access to Union courts in civil cases with third country defendants, Ministry of Jus-
tice, available at: http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2012/Discus-
sion_paper_4_Brussels_I-Regulation.pdf (last visited 31. 8. 2016) 
29 CJEU 22. 5. 2008, C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline, Laboratoires GlaxoSmithKline/Jean-Pierre Rouard. Of course, if the 
employee carries out work for all employees in the same place, a joinder of defendants in one claim is still possi-
ble – following the criteria of Art. 19 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
30 CJEU 22. 5. 2008, C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline, Laboratoires GlaxoSmithKline/Jean-Pierre Rouard. 
31 E.g. Sebastian Krebber, Einheitlicher Gerichtsstand für die Klage eines Arbeitnehmers gegen mehrere Arbeitgeber bei 
Beschäftigung in einem grenzüberschreitenden Konzern, 29 IPRAX, 409 (2009); Uglješa Grušić, Jurisdiction in Employ-
ment Matters Under Brussels I: A Reassessment, 61 ICLQ, 91, 94 (2012).  
32 Already in its Report and Green Paper of 21 April 2009, COM(2009), 174 final, at section 3.8.2. and COM(2009) 
175 final, at Q.8, the Commission contemplated the possibility of extending jurisdiction over co-defendants pur-
suant to Art. 6(1) to employment matters.  
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join co-defendants in a court that has jurisdiction for one of them, provided that the general 
requirements for such a joinder are met.33 Only the weaker party (the employee) can benefit 
from the new rule. Hence, the employer cannot invoke jurisdiction over co-defendants in the 
event of claims against several employees. 
IV. Clarification of the concept of the place where work is habitually 
carried out  
The Regulation provides for jurisdiction regarding claims against the employer in the place where 
the employee habitually carries out his work. The CJEU has already clarified that where the work 
is performed in more than one Member State, it is the place in which or from which the employee 
principally discharges his obligations towards his employer34 or “where, or from which, he in fact 
performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.”35 In this regard, it is decisive 
whether an employee has an office in a certain state from which he organises his own work activi-
ties or those of his employer and to which he returns after each business trip to another country. 
If such an office exists, it shall be deemed the habitual place of work.36 If this is not the case, then 
it must be determined where the employee has established the effective centre of his work activi-
ties.37  
The Brussels I Recast does not bring any real changes with regard to the presented regime. There 
is a certain distinction in the wording of the new Article 21(1)b, as it refers to a place where or 
from where the employee habitually carries out his work. Nevertheless, the insertion of the 
phrase “or from where” merely adopts the criterion of the “base”, which has already been firmly 
established by the CJEU’s case law on Regulation 44/2001 (see supra). Therefore, this does not 
amount to a substantial change but rather a clarification, which also brings the definition in the 
Brussels I Regulation (essentially) in line with Art. 8 of the Rome I Regulation,38 which lays down a 
conflict-of-laws rule on the applicable law governing contracts of employment.  
Art. 21(1) of the Regulation also enables employees to bring proceedings in the courts of the 
place where the business that engaged the employee is or was situated if the employee does not 
or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country. This option is not really favourable for 
the employee, but rather more for the defendant. It is, hence, not surprising that the CJEU opted 
for an extensive interpretation of the first option (habitual place of work), thus narrowing the 
scope of applicability of the second option.39 Since it now seems that it is (almost) always possible 
to determine the place where the work is habitually carried out (also in the case of employees 
                                                
33 Pursuant to Art. 8(1) 1215/2012 Regulation, a jurisdiction for co-defendants is available if the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings.  
34 CJEU 13. 7. 1993, C-125/92, Mulox IBC Ltd/Hendrick Geels.  
35 CJEU 9. 1. 1997, C-383/95, Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten/Cross Medical Ltd. 
36 Ibidem. 
37 CJEU 13. 7. 1993, C-125/92, Mulox IBC Ltd/Hendrick Geels.  
38 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations. 
39 CJEU 15. 3. 2011, C-29/10, Heiko Koelzsch/État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. The case related to the Rome I 
Regulation, but its rationale is equally applicable to the Brussels I Regulation; see Alessandra Zanobetti, Employ-
ment Contracts and the Rome Convention, the Koelzsch Ruling of the European Court of Justice, 3 CUADERNOS DE 
DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL, 338 (2011); http://e-revistas.uc3m.es/index.php/CDT/article/view/1340 (last visited 31. 8. 
2016); see also CJEU 15. 12. 2011, C-384/10, Jan Voogsgeerd/Navimer SA. 
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performing work in different countries, and even in the event in which no proper “base” can be 
established40), questions are raised whether it makes sense at all to still retain the second option 
as well.41 Nevertheless, the Recast did not bring any changes in this regard.  
V. Jurisdiction based on entering an appearance 
A protective jurisdictional regime favourable for the weaker party can only be effective if it is 
concurrently ensured that the weaker party may not, in principle, contractually agree to another 
jurisdiction to the detriment of the procedural protection of sections 3-5 of the Brussels I Regula-
tion. Therefore, Arts. 13, 17, and 21 considerably limit the power of the other party to the con-
tract to depart from procedural protection by means of a jurisdiction agreement. Otherwise, 
looking at the situation realistically (as the CJEU determines in another context42), the weaker 
party would be exposed to agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the other party without 
being able to influence the content of those terms.  
When entering into an employment contract, the average worker, consumer, or insured does not 
give due consideration to the jurisdiction clause that forms a part of the contract, especially in 
the context of a pre-formulated standard contract. For this reason, jurisdiction agreements (to 
the detriment of the jurisdictional norms of Sections 3-5) cannot already be included in the con-
tract. Only subsequent jurisdiction agreements (agreements concluded after the dispute has 
already materialised) are admissible. At this stage even an average worker, consumer, or insured 
should be attentive as to the determination of the forum for the resolution of disputes and give 
due consideration to the potential proposal of the other party to enter into a jurisdiction agree-
ment. 
It follows from Art. 24 (which corresponds to Art. 26 in the Recast) that if the weaker party enters, 
as a defendant, an appearance without contesting jurisdiction, the court may not declare the lack 
of jurisdiction of its own motion if the provisions of Sections 3-5 are not complied with. Entering 
an appearance in such a manner amounts to a tacit prorogation of jurisdiction, which is also 
possible in disputes covered by Sections 3-5. In the context of the jurisdictional regime concern-
ing insurance contracts, the CJEU confirmed this finding in Bilas.43  
A different question, however, is whether in the early stage of proceedings (such as when it 
serves the claim and instructs the defendant to file a defence plea) the court should forewarn the 
defendant that the proceedings were brought in a court that lacks jurisdiction and that he may 
raise a (timely) objection as to the lack of jurisdiction. If such a requirement is not imposed, this 
can seriously impede the effectiveness of the protective jurisdictional regime. There is no guaran-
tee that certain employers or traders, for example, would not deliberately file actions against 
workers in courts lacking jurisdiction, counting on the probability that the weaker party, unfamil-
iar with the protective regime of the Brussels Regulation and not represented by a lawyer, would 
fail to raise a timely objection about the lack of jurisdiction.44 Furthermore, the lack of uniform 
                                                
40 CJEU 15. 3. 2011, C-29/10, Heiko Koelzsch/État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. 
41 Uglješa Grušić, Should the Connecting Factor of the “Engaging Place of Business” be Abolished in European Private 
International Law? 62ICLQ, 173 (2013). 
42 CJEU 4. 6. 2009, C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt./Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi.  
43 CJEU 20. 5. 2010, C-111/09, Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group/Michal Bilas. 
44 See, e.g., Uglješa Grušić, Submission and Protective Jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation, 43 CMLR, 947, 953 
(2011). 
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European standards in this respect can result in a different level of effectiveness of procedural 
consumer protection in those Member States where national law or practice provide for such a 
forewarning with regard to the lack of jurisdiction45 and those Member States where this is not 
the case.46  
Although tacit prorogation of jurisdiction may sometimes occur to the undue detriment of the 
weaker parties who do not have proper access to legal advice, in Bilas47 the CJEU refrained from 
requiring a court to instruct the defendant about the consequences of his possible entering an 
appearance. In the CJEU’s view, such an obligation could not be imposed other than by the intro-
duction of an express rule to that effect in the Brussels I Regulation.48 When drafting the recast 
Regulation, the Commission had due regard for these observations of the CJEU. An express rule 
to the effect of forewarning the consumer, employee, or insured about his right to contest the 
jurisdiction of the court and the consequences of entering an appearance is now indeed provided 
for in the new Brussels I Regulation. Pursuant to Art. 26(2) of the new Regulation, the court will 
need to ensure, before assuming jurisdiction on the basis of a tacit jurisdiction agreement, that 
information concerning the consequences of entering an appearance without contesting jurisdic-
tion has been provided to the defendant. 
In general, the new rule is properly balanced.49 On the one hand, it rejected the radical view that 
jurisdiction based on entering an appearance should not apply to weaker parties at all,50 whereas 
on the other it acknowledged that a certain level of additional protection is needed. This new rule 
is, however, likely to give rise to new questions in practice. 
First, the new rule does not unambiguously answer the question how precise and explicit the 
court’s instruction to (or information for) the defendant should be. The wording of the rule sug-
gests that it is sufficient for the court to reiterate, in rather abstract terms (although probably in 
plain language understandable to legally unrepresented parties) the relevant provision of the 
Regulation concerning the consequences of failure to object the lack of jurisdiction, leaving it for 
the consumer to (possibly) discover by himself whether the claim was indeed brought in a court 
lacking jurisdiction. It does not follow from the wording that the court should go one step further 
and positively advise the consumer that it lacks jurisdiction under the Regulation in the first 
place.  
The practical effect of this issue should not be underestimated. If an (unrepresented) consumer 
or employee is merely advised of the consequences of entering an appearance, leaving it for the 
defendant to determine whether there is a lack of jurisdiction in the first place, it can be expected 
                                                
45 See, e.g., Paragraph 504 of the German ZPO (for Amtsgerichte). 
46 E.g., in Slovenia the defendant must, in order to not be in default, file a written defence plea on the merits and 
neither is there any oral communication between the court and the defendant beforehand, nor does the court 
give, upon serving the claim, any written hints and observations, except the instruction to file a defence plea and 
the warning that a judgment on default can be rendered if the defendant fails to comply with this instruction; 
see Art. 277 of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o pravdnem postopku). 
47 CJEU 20. 5. 2010, C-111/09, Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group/Michal Bilas. 
48 Ibidem. However, the CJEU adds that it is always open to the court seised to ensure, having regard to the objec-
tive of the rules on jurisdiction resulting from Sections 3 to 5 of Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation, i.e. to of-
fer stronger protection to the party considered to be the weaker party, that the defendant being sued before it in 
those circumstances is fully aware of the consequences of his agreement to enter an appearance. 
49 See also Lazić, supra note 1, 109. 
50 For such view, see: Peter A. Nielsen, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION Art. 17 Brussels I Regulation Rz 15 (Ulrich Magnus & 
Peter Mankowski eds., 2007). 
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that not many defendants would actually engage in research on the jurisdictional regime. This 
would especially be the case if “information” were given in written form and in a formulaic (“copy-
paste”) manner (particularly nowadays, when documents served by the court are already accom-
panied by such an amount of instructions and information that many parties no longer even read 
all of them carefully).  
If, however, the court must, in such cases, positively advise the defendant that the claim (at least) 
appears to have been brought in a court lacking jurisdiction and provide the information about 
the consequences of entering an appearance, most defendants would probably raise a plea of 
lack of jurisdiction. The second option is clearly more weaker-party friendly, but it seems incom-
patible with the restrictive wording of the discussed provision. In addition, it is not always possi-
ble for the court to assess at an early stage of proceedings whether the case indeed concerns a 
consumer dispute (i.e. whether the defendant was not acting in a professional capacity). 
Concerning the question of who needs to inform the defendant (the court or the claimant), it 
seems logical that this should be the task of the court, probably in written form, when serving the 
claim on the defendant. Nevertheless, in countries where it is the claimant's duty to serve the 
claim upon the defendant even before filing it with the court, it is conceivable that proper infor-
mation should be provided already by the claimant in the statement of the claim. Information 
should in any case be given as soon as possible. If the court cannot ascertain whether the case 
concerns a consumer dispute (or if it neglects its obligation to provide proper information), the 
omission can still be remedied at a later stage. In such case the court – if the defendant objects 
the lack of jurisdiction after having received such information – must accept it as timely and con-
sider it as admissible even if the defendant has already pleaded his defence on the merits. Art. 
26(2) of the Brussels I Recast makes it sufficiently clear that a tacit jurisdiction agreement cannot 
be concluded before proper information has been given to the defendant. This rule should pre-
vail over any applicable rules of national law determining that pleas of lack of jurisdiction should 
be raised in limine litis. 
Finally, the question arises about the consequences of the court’s failure to ensure that the de-
fendant, as the weaker party, has received adequate information. In general, a violation of this 
protective jurisdictional regime precludes recognition of the judgment in other Member States. 
The problem is that while Art. 45(1) of the Brussels I Recast (which enumerates the cases in which 
violations of jurisdictional rules constitute grounds for denial of recognition and enforcement) 
refers to Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Chapter II, it does not explicitly include a breach of Art. 26(2), 
which lies in section 7.51 The purpose and the context of the rule would imply that a violation of 
the obligation to provide adequate information to the weaker party could result in the sanction 
of non-recognition of the judgment delivered by the court where the weaker party entered an 
appearance without contesting jurisdiction (given that this court in fact lacked jurisdiction).  
The wording of the Regulation does not preclude such an interpretation. It should be noted that 
in the Bilas case the CJEU already held that a submission by entering an appearance (tacit juris-
diction agreement) is an available basis for jurisdiction in disputes involving weaker parties not-
                                                
51 In the relevant parts, Art. 45(1) reads as follows: “On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a 
judgment shall be refused: […] if the judgment conflicts with: (i) Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II where the policy-
holder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee was 
the defendant […]” 
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withstanding the fact that the rule on submission is neither contained nor referred to in the three 
sections containing protective jurisdictional rules.52 However, it follows from this reasoning that 
although after the adoption of the Brussels I Recast, jurisdiction by submission is not per se in 
conflict with Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Brussels I Regulation, it nevertheless is in such conflict if it 
was assumed without previously giving adequate information to the weaker party. 
VI. Violation of the Protective Jurisdictional Regime as Grounds for 
Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment 
Regulation No. 44/2001 reinforced procedural protection concerning insurance and consumer 
contracts providing that the violation of jurisdictional protective norms can, at the request of any 
interested party, result in a denial of recognition of the judgment pursuant to Art. 35(1). No such 
safeguard has been established for disputes arising out of employment contracts, however. This 
was based on a rather pragmatic reasoning that the vast majority of employment disputes in 
Europe (more than 90 %) concern cases where employees act as claimants and therefore in the 
vast majority of labour disputes it is not necessary to provide for a special safeguard concerning 
jurisdiction regarding the recognition and enforcement stage.53 
The rule was slightly changed in the Brussels I Recast. Recognition may still be refused on the 
same grounds already provided for under Regulation 44/2001 (now under Art. 45), whereby 
breaching the grounds for jurisdiction over individual employment disputes is included as an 
obstacle to recognition. It is now also explicitly stated that breaching the protective jurisdictional 
regime is an obstacle to recognition only in cases where the weaker party (a policyholder, the 
insured, a beneficiary of an insurance contract, an injured party, a consumer, or an employee) 
was the defendant. The ratio legis of the rule would lead to the same result already under the old 
Brussels I Regulation,54 however, at least the wording of its Art. 35(1) would imply that the rule 
could also adversely affect the weaker party that brought the proceedings in a court lacking ju-
risdiction. 
VII. Conclusion 
Although the changes brought about by the Brussels I Regulation Recast to the protective jurisdic-
tional regime for weaker parties are not as far-reaching as in certain other fields (e.g. abolishing of 
exequatur, enhancing jurisdiction agreements, cross-border effects of protective measures), they 
are nevertheless important and raise the procedural protection of these parties to an even higher 
level. The most significant changes concern the limited extension of the scope of applicability 
against defendants from third states and jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance. 
This being said, a conservative approach is preferred when it comes to the reform of such a suc-
cessful instrument as the Brussels I Regulation undoubtedly proved to be. Therefore, it should 
not be seen as regretful that certain more ambitious plans for large-scale reform were rejected.  
                                                
52 See, e.g., Grušić, supra note 44, 947. 
53 The EU Commission, Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal of the Brussels I Regulation, COM 
(1999) 348 final, Brussels, 14.07.1999, 23, available at: http://www.statewatch.org/semdoc/assets/files/commission/ 
COM-1999-348.pdf (last visited 31. 8. 2016). 
54 REINHOLD GEIMER & ROLF A. SCHÜTZE, EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT (2010) Art. 35 at 47 and Art. 16 at 16. 
ALJ 2/2016 The Brussels I Regulation Recast 134 
 
By not substantially departing from the existing regime, the EU legislature also ensured that the 
rich body of the case law of the CJEU, which has already brought several important clarifications 
and strengthened legal certainty in this area, remains fully relevant. Although in certain instances 
it seems that the Brussels I Recast effectively overrules the CJEU’s case law (e.g., Bilas, Glaxo-
SmithKline), it should be noted that these are cases where the CJEU itself suggested that the out-
comes are not necessarily preferred, but are, however, based on the clear text of the Regulation 
and it is therefore the responsibility of the EU legislature to intervene. By following these “hints” 
of the CJEU, the European legislature actually reaffirmed the preeminent position of the Court 
concerning the development of European civil procedure. 
On a negative side, the recast also brought some new dilemmas and uncertainties, perhaps due 
to its poor drafting, in particular regarding the question whether the rule concerning extension of 
applicability against non-EU based employers and traders provides merely for an EU-wide mini-
mum standard or removes and replaces jurisdiction rules of member states’ national laws. 
